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1. Introduction 
The Japanese payout limit system, which had been frozen in the latter half of the 1990s because 
of the serious depression of the financial system, was partially unfrozen in 2002.1 In 2005, the 
payout limit system was fully unfrozen, and deposits (except deposits for settlement) over 
10,000,000 yen are now not always protected when a financial institution fails.2 That is to say, a 
depositor who is unconcerned about the management of his financial institution runs the risk that his 
deposit assets might decrease. 
To cope well with these situations, depositors must utilize disclosure contents provided by 
financial institutions to identify a solid financial institution, and they must also continue to pay 
attention to the soundness of the selected financial institution. Policy authorities now require 
financial institutions to disclose more information than before; as a result, the soundness of financial 
institutions is now clearer than ever. Nevertheless, it is not always easy for general depositors 
(except big depositors like firms) to interpret and analyze the data in a financial statement. In order 
to demonstrate their solidness in the market, financial institutions that are compared with other 
institutions and selected by customers should not only disclose the information required by 
authorities but should also freely and voluntarily disclose additional information that is not so 
required. 
Obtaining credit ratings is one of the strongest means of disclosure. Not only big depositors such 
as firms but also general depositors can interpret credit ratings easily because they are indicated by 
single letters of the alphabet. Many financial institutions show their credit rating rankings on their 
homepage, including annual reports, etc., probably because they recognize importance of disclosure 
to all market participants. But because obtaining credit ratings is undertaken voluntarily, some 
financial institutions obtain credit ratings while others do not, as discussed in Section 3. Particularly 
large differences can be observed among financial institutions in obtaining credit ratings from 
foreign rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s). 
In the present study, we investigated what types of Japanese regional banks are currently more 
likely to obtain credit ratings when disclosures by financial institutions have become more important 
than ever. We also analyzed whether regional banks that disclose more credit ratings succeed in 
obtaining financing from depositors now that the freeze on the payout limit system has been lifted. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, previous studies on disclosure activities 
by financial institutions are reviewed. In Section 3, the data and methodologies employed in the 
present study are explained. Section 4 presents and interprets the empirical results, and a summary 
and conclusions are provided in final section. 
                                                  
1 Only the payout limit system on savings deposits such as time deposits was unfrozen in 2002. 
2 Deposits for settlement that satisfy all of the following criteria are now protected by deposit 
insurance: (1) no interest is paid on the deposit; (2) the deposit is a demand deposit; and (3) the 
deposit may be used for settlement. 
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2. Literature Review 
Previous studies that analyze the characteristics of firms that are aggressively about disclosing 
credit ratings include Moon and Stotsky (1993), Cantor and Packer (1994, 1997), Pottier and 
Sommer (1999).3
Moon and Stotsky (1993) analyzed the characteristics of firms that obtain credit ratings from 
S&P and Moody’s and the determinants of rank of both credit ratings. They found that firms that 
have larger debts tend to obtain more credit ratings. Cantor and Packer (1994) investigated the 
characteristics of firms that obtain third credit ratings (other than S&P and Moody’s) in the issue of 
floating junk bonds, finding that firms that are classified as near-investment-grade by S&P and 
Moody’s and those that are classified as investment-grade by either S&P or Moody’s are more likely 
to obtain credit ratings from other agencies. 
Cantor and Packer (1997) investigated the motivations of firms to seek credit ratings voluntarily 
from agencies other than S&P and Moody’s.4 It can be said that if ex ante uncertainties about default 
risks of firms whose leverage and return on assets (ROA) (profitability) are high become greater, 
they might obtain more credit ratings in order to decrease uncertainties about their default risks. 
Cantor and Packer (1997) analyzed whether or not this is true, clarifying that this tendency is not 
observed. They also revealed that firms that have greater outstanding debt, and that might potentially 
profit more by obtaining credit ratings, are more likely to be aggressive in obtaining credit ratings. 
On the other hand, Pottier and Sommer (1999) concluded that insurance companies whose leverage 
and ROA are higher tend to obtain credit ratings actively. Pottier and Sommer (1999) also showed 
that insurance companies that raise more premium income, which is the debt of insurance companies, 
obtain more credit ratings. 
Yamori (2004) and Spiegel and Yamori (2006) investigated what types of Japanese credit unions 
tend to disclose bad loans when such disclosures by credit unions are voluntary. They found that 
credit unions with more serious bad loans were less likely to choose voluntary disclosure, while 
larger credit unions were more likely to disclose information. Market forces, as measured by the 
intensity of local competition, did not force banks to disclose more information in March 1996, but 
did in March 1997. Kondo (2008) investigated what types of credit unions obtain credit ratings 
voluntarily, with nearly the same results as those of Yamori (2004) and Spiegel and Yamori (2006). 
                                                  
3 In addition to these studies, Poon (2003) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) have also analyzed 
credit ratings. Poon (2003) investigated whether unsolicited credit ratings are biased downwards in 
contrast to solicited ratings. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) investigated whether firms’ corporate 
governances affect their credit rating rankings. 
4 Hsueh and Kidwell (1988) analyzed whether firms that obtain more than two credit ratings can 
decrease borrowing costs when they float bonds to finance, concluding that such firms can finance at 
lower cost when the ratings given by the two agencies are the same. And Cantor and Packer (1994) 
showed that ratings of investment-grade are given more easily when firms obtain a third (or fourth) 
credit rating. 
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3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Methodology 
The objective credit rating agencies considered in the present paper are S&P, Moody’s, the Japan 
Credit Rating Agency (JCR) and Rating and Investment Information (R&I).5 The dependent variable 
was the number of credit ratings that a regional bank obtained and the equation was estimated using 
an ordered probit model. When ranking credit ratings, JCR evaluates the market environment in 
which a bank operates, the financial base and earning power of the bank, and the safety net of the 
bank. We consider independent variables, taking into consideration the aspects evaluated by the JCR 
as well as previous studies, and using the variables as explained below. 
JCR evaluates the market environment in which a bank operates based on the following three 
points: (1) the stability of the Japanese financial system, (2) the stability and growth characteristics 
of the geographical area in which the bank operates, and (3) the management team and operation 
policy of the bank. We focus here on (2) because the characteristics of regional banks can be easily 
determined, but do not examine (1) because every bank faces the same situation, or (3) because it is 
difficult obtain the necessary data. The following three items are used as proxy variables of (b): the 
gross domestic product (GDPi) in the prefecture where the headquarters of bank i is located is used 
as an index of economic performance; the Herfindahl index (Concentrationi) in the prefecture where 
the headquarters of bank i is located is used as the degree of market concentration; and the ratio of 
the bank balance of bank i to the sum of bank balances (Sharei) in the prefecture where the 
headquarters of bank i is located is used as the index of share in the regional market. 
Among these variables, the Herfindahl index is a variable that tests whether banks in more 
competitive markets are pressured to disclose voluntarily by market discipline, as concluded by 
Spiegel and Yamori (2006) and Kondo (2008). If banks in more competitive regions tend to disclose 
credit ratings to raise customer confidence, the coefficient of Concentrationi will be negative. The 
Herfindahl index is calculated based on the deposit accounts of first-tier regional banks, second-tier 
regional banks and credit unions. 
The financial base and earning power of a bank is evaluated by the volume of risks that the bank 
has and the preparations taken to manage those risks, capitalization, and the level and stability of the 
profit. The share of stock-holding to assets (Riski) and the bad debt ratio (Badi) are proxy variables. 
The capital-asset ratio (Capitali) and the ROA (ROAi) are used as proxies of capitalization and the 
level of the profit, respectively. 
                                                  
5 In examining the Fitch Ratings, we were unable to distinguish solicited credit ratings from 
unsolicited ratings on the Fitch Ratings homepage. So we asked Fitch Ratings about this and were 
told that they do not distinguish solicited from unsolicited ratings, but do distinguish between 
participating and non-participating ratings; that is, whether the rated firms participated in the process 
of evaluating credit ratings. Because it is difficult to distinguish participating from non-participating 
ratings according to the data we can obtain, we excluded the Fitch Ratings from this research. 
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Banks that have more stock holdings tend to face the risk of holding a larger unrealized loss. 
The coefficient of Riski will be positive if such banks acquire credit ratings to dispel the uncertainties 
about market risks. Pottier and Sommer (1999) tested whether this hypothesis is true. But it can also 
be considered that banks that have many stock holdings are not managed appropriately. The 
coefficient of Riski will be negative if such banks make light of information disclosure. 
The bad debt ratio is an index that tests whether banks that have inconvenient information of 
their own tend to hide this information, as discussed by Spiegel and Yamori (2006) and Kondo 
(2008). According to both of these studies, it is expected that the coefficient of Badi will be negative. 
As noted in both Cantor and Packer (1997) and Pottier and Sommer (1999), if banks whose 
leverage and ROA are higher face more uncertainties about default risks and therefore want to dispel 
them by disclosing credit ratings, the coefficient of Capitali (the inverse of leverage) will be negative  
that of ROAi will be positive. But higher leverage also reflects lower reserve force to take risks. Thus, 
such banks might be less likely to obtain credit ratings because they are afraid of being assigned a 
lower rank. Banks that achieve a higher ROA obtain credit ratings because they are very likely to be 
given higher ratings, rather than to reduce uncertainties about their default risks. Furthermore, there 
are some regional banks that are required to clear the BIS (The Bank for International Settlement) 
standard (8%) for the capital-asset ratio and there are other regional banks that are required to clear 
domestic rule (4%). We therefore subtract 8% from the capital-asset ratio of banks to which the BIS 
standard is applied, and subtract 4% from the capital-asset ratio of all other banks.  
On the safety net, the deposit insurance system, which is a representative safety net in the 
financial system, is not considered here because the same guarantee is applied to all failed banks. 
However, the effect of the too big to fail (TBTF) policy should be tested, as in Spiegel and Yamori 
(2006) and Kondo (2008). If the policy that authorities do not intentionally let large banks fail in 
order to avoid large damages to regional economies is maintained now, depositors of larger banks do 
not tend to pay attention to the financial position of the banks they use. In this case, it is believed that 
larger banks do not actively acquire credit ratings. Asset (Asseti) is used as a proxy of scale.  
We also introduce a dummy variable (Dummyi) that takes 0 if no other bank in a bank’s 
prefecture goes bankrupt, and that takes 1 if at least one other bank goes bankrupt in the same 
prefecture. In this paper, banks that have failed since 1995 are regarded as failed banks.6 If the 
depositors in a prefecture that has experienced bankruptcy are more suspicious of the 
creditworthiness of private financial institutions7 and therefore banks in those regions tend to 
disclose credit ratings to decrease those suspicions, the coefficient of Dummyi will be positive. This 
                                                  
6 The failure of the Hyogo bank in 1995 was the first case of a Japanese bankruptcy after World War 
II. 
7 Cargill and Yoshino (2003) also showed that depositors of private financial institutions shifted their 
deposits from private financial institutions to postal savings in regions that experienced 
bankruptcies. 
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dummy variable is introduced to test the hypothesis presented by in Spiegel and Yamori (2006). 
 
3.2. Data 
Let us examine the descriptive statistics of the data used in the present study. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of independent variables in the estimated model. Table 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the number of credit ratings obtained by regional banks. The data in Table 1 dates from 
the end of March 2008, and those in Table 2 are based on the data on the homepages of the credit 
rating agencies used here on August 11, 2009. “Domestic” in Table 2 means the descriptive statistics 
of the number of credit ratings obtained from domestic credit rating agencies (JCR and R&I); 
“Foreign” means those obtained from foreign credit rating agencies (S&P and Moody’s); and “Total” 
is the sum of “Domestic” and “Foreign”. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (independent variables). 
  Concentration Share Risk Bad Capital ROA 
Maximum 624.267  142.682  9.084  31.291  10.340  1.054  
Minimum 7454.352  0.590  0.291  3.940  1.580  -4.566 
Mean 3934.201  30.923  2.074  8.820  5.895  0.210  
Std. Dev. 1569.295  25.758  1.231  3.980  1.787  0.659  
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (number of obtained credit ratings). 
  Domestic Foreign Total 
Maximum 2 2 4 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Mean 1 0.321 1.321 
Std. Dev. 0.549 0.544 0.834 
Observations 106 106 106 
 
Let us now consider Table 2. Japanese regional banks tend to obtain credit ratings from domestic 
credit rating agencies rather than from foreign ones. The average number of credit ratings obtained is 
1.3. Nevertheless, one regional bank obtained ratings from all 4 agencies, and 15 regional banks 
obtained none. Taking into consideration the fact that all 4 Japanese city banks obtained credit 
ratings from all 4 agencies. it is clear that regional banks are less likely to disclose than city banks. 
The sources of the data employed in this paper include the bank balances, lending accounts, 
assets, stock holdings, ordinary profits and capital-asset ratios of each bank, and the lending 
accounts of each credit union are quoted from the Nikkei NEEDS (Nikkei Economic Electronic 
 5
Databank System).  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Background of Obtaining Credit Ratings 
We investigated what types of regional banks are more likely to disclose credit ratings. We 
examined regional banks that had obtained credit ratings as of August 11, 2009 by using the 
homepages of S&P, Moody’s, JCR and R&I. The dummy variable, which indicates the number of 
credit ratings that each bank acquires, was introduced as a dependent variable and an ordered probit 
model was estimated. The present estimated results are shown in Table 3. In Table 3, RANK shows 
the situation in which the dummy variable reflects all 4 credit ratings agencies; RANKF indicates 
foreign agencies (S&P and Moody’s); and RANKD indicates domestic agencies (JCR and R&I).  
 
Table 3. Estimated results. 
 RANK RANKD RANKF 
 Coefficient （z-value） Coefficient （z-value） Coefficient （z-value） 
Concentration -0.000*** （-3.122） -0.000** （-2.394） -0.000** （-2.504） 
GDP -0.702*** （-2.838） -0.411 （-1.641） -1.287*** （-2.745） 
Share 0.012 （1.377） 0.008 （0.853） 0.016 （1.260） 
Asset 0.776*** （3.522） 0.503** （2.286） 1.123*** （2.787） 
Risk 0.051 （0.497） -0.007 （-0.061） -0.016 （-0.115） 
Bad -0.042 （-1.072） -0.019 （-0.456） -0.309*** （-2.678） 
Capital -0.097 （-1.325） -0.059 （-0.739） -0.055 （-0.580） 
ROA 0.024 （0.106） -0.201 （-0.848） 2.109** （2.488） 
Dummy 0.399 （1.260） -0.276 （-0.801） 1.475*** （3.177） 
MU2 2.218*** （8.098） 2.471*** （9.935） 2.021*** （5.635） 
MU3 3.587***（10.388）   
MU4 4.812*** （8.878）   
Scaled-R2 0.481 0.236 0.551 
Log likelihood -97.229 -73.952 -42.556 
Samples 106 106 106 
* indicates significance at the 10％ level; ** significance at the 5％ level; *** significance at the 
1％ level. 
 
Let us first consider RANK. The coefficient of Concentrationi is negative and significant at the 
1% level. Regional banks in more competitive markets are pressured to disclose by market 
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disciplines. This result is consistent with those of Spiegel and Yamori (2006) and Kondo (2008). The 
coefficient of GDPi is negative and significant at the 1% level. If pulling power and the solidness of 
regional banks are higher in rich regions, monitoring management of regional banks by depositors, 
stockholders and other customers might be weaker in such regions. If so, regional banks in such 
regions might not be strongly pressured to disclose by market forces.  
With respect to the independent variables concerning the characteristics of each bank, the 
coefficient of Asseti is significantly positive at the 1% level. It can be deduced that large regional 
banks, where economies of scale are at work, obtain more credit ratings because they can easily 
afford to pay credit rating agencies. We might also point out that larger regional banks acquire more 
credit ratings to compete with city banks, which frequently acquire credit ratings from all 4 agencies. 
The coefficient of Dummyi is not significant. Thus, failures of other banks in the same region do 
not entail pressure to disclose. This result is consistent with that of Spiegel and Yamori (2006). The 
coefficients of Capitali and ROAi are also insignificant. This is different from the results reported by 
Pottier and Sommer (1999) but consistent with those of Cantor and Packer (1997). 
The coefficient of Badi is negative and insignificant. This result differs from those of Spiegel 
and Yamori (2006) and Kondo (2008). 
Let us now consider RANKF and RANKD. The coefficient of Concentrationi is negative and 
significant at the 5% level in both cases and the coefficient of Asseti is positive and significant (the 
former at the 1% level and the latter at the 5% level). In other words, regional banks in more 
competitive markets and larger regional banks in which the scale of economies is at work tend to 
disclose credit ratings whether acquired from domestic or foreign agencies. 
The coefficient of Badi for RANKF is significantly negative at the 1% level, which is different 
from its result for RANK. This is consistent with the results of Spiegel and Yamori (2006) and 
Kondo (2008). Taking all of these results into consideration, it is reasonable to state that regional 
banks that hold inconvenient information are afraid of being given low credit ratings and are 
therefore less likely to seek credit ratings, especially from foreign agencies. 
The coefficient of ROAi is significantly positive at the 5% level at for RANKF. Taking into 
consideration the fact that the coefficient of Capitali, which is the inverse of leverage, is insignificant, 
it follows naturally that the significant coefficient of ROAi means that banks that reach a high ROA 
obtain credit ratings because it is highly likely that they will be given high ratings, and not because 
they want to decrease uncertainty about their default risks. 
The coefficient of Dummyi for RANKF is positive and significant at the 1% level, which is 
different form its result for RANK. Thus, regional banks in regions where other banks have failed 
feel themselves required to defend their own soundness by obtaining foreign credit ratings.8
                                                  
8 We took failures of credit unions into consideration in setting Dummyi and in the associated 
estimations. As a result, this coefficient was significantly positive at the 5% level in this estimation 
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4.2. Effects of Disclosure of Credit Ratings on Deposit Accounts 
Let us now examine whether voluntarily obtaining credit ratings has a positive effect on the 
management of regional banks. Specifically, the following Cobb-Douglas production function was 
estimated and we tested whether gaining credit ratings can increase the bank balances of regional 
banks. 
 
logDepositi = c0 + c1 logLabori + c2 logBranchi + c3Disclosurei     (1) 
 
Depositi is the bank balance (average balance) of bank i. Labori and Branchi are the number of 
people on the staff of the bank and the number of its branches, which are factors of production. Data 
are quoted from Nikkei NEEDS at the end of March 2009. Disclosurei is the disclosure dummy that 
indicates the number of credit ratings obtained by the bank.  
As mentioned in Section 1, the total amount of deposit for settlement is protected by deposit 
insurance when a bank fails. To take this into consideration, Depositi is calculated by the bank 
balance (average balance) of bank i minus the outstanding balance (average balance) of its checking 
accounts. The estimated results are shown in Table 4. Standard errors are calculated as White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent errors. 
 
Table 4. Estimated results (dependent variable = deposit accounts minus checking accounts). 
  RANK RANKD RANKF 
  Coefficient （t-value） Coefficient （t-value） Coefficient （t-value） 
Constant 4.334*** （14.175） 3.986*** （16.135） 4.265*** （16.300） 
Labor 1.172*** （13.345） 1.219*** （15.048） 1.192*** （14.675） 
Branch 0.171  （1.446） 0.189  （1.643） 0.168  （1.496） 
Disclosure 0.066** （2.234） 0.017  （0.413） 0.091** （2.588） 
Adj-R2 0.962 0.960 0.962 
Samples  106  106  106 
* indicates significance at the 10％ level; ** significance at the 5％ level; *** significance at the 
1％ level. 
 
The coefficient of Disclosurei is significantly positive at the 5% level for RANK, whose object 
of Disclosurei is all 4 credit rating agencies. Thus, regional banks that disclose more credit ratings 
succeeded in raising more deposits from depositors. 
Now let us consider the results for both RANKF and RANKD, whose object of Disclosurei is 2 
                                                                                                                                                  
as well. 
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foreign agencies and 2 domestic agencies, respectively. The coefficient of Disclosurei for the former 
is positive and significant at the 5% level while that for the latter is positive but insignificant. Based 
on these results, it can be concluded that regional banks that disclose more foreign credit ratings, 
which cost a lot, can increase their bank balances, but it can not be asserted that regional banks that 
disclose more domestic credit ratings have an advantage in obtaining financing from depositors.9
 
5. Conclusions 
The present study focused on the obtaining of credit ratings by Japanese regional banks and 
investigated what types of regional banks are more likely to disclose these ratings and whether their 
acquisition functions positively in the management of regional banks. 
First, we conclude that regional banks in more competitive markets are required to disclose 
credit ratings due to market disciplines. Furthermore, larger regional banks, in which economies of 
scale are at work, tend to disclose credit ratings because the charges paid to credit rating agencies 
might not affect them unduly and they might be conscious of competing with city banks, all of which 
obtain credit ratings from all 4 agencies considered here. Finally, regional banks with a higher bad 
debt ratio are less likely to acquire credit ratings to hide inconvenient news of their own. 
Based on our analysis focusing on the acquisition of foreign credit ratings, few note first that 
regional banks whose bad debt ratio is lower and whose ROA is higher, in other words, regional 
banks that are highly likely to be given high ratings, positively disclose foreign credit ratings. 
Additionally, regional banks in areas where other banks went bankrupt are under extreme pressure to 
defend their own solidness actively to the markets by obtaining foreign credit ratings. 
We also investigated whether disclosures by regional banks have positive effects on financing 
from depositors, finding that regional banks that obtain more credit ratings, in particular foreign 
ratings, can increase their bank balances.  
Now that disclosures are widely regarded as necessary for market disciplines, it has been shown 
that disclosures of credit ratings have positive effects on regional banks. Nevertheless, there are 
important issues that remain for future research. The reliability of the disclosed credit ratings 
remains to be clarified. Furthermore, remembering that credit ratings that were given to securitized 
papers of subprime loans were not evaluated properly, it remains unclear to what extent general 
customers should trust disclosed information.  
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